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DEFENSE EXPENDITURES IN PAKISTAN: 
A SOURCE OF STIMULUS FOR OR COMPETITION 
WITH THE PRIVATE SECTOR? 
By 
Robert E. Looney* 
Introduction: 
Toward the end of 1988, Pakistan's deteriorating 
resource situation caused a financial crisis, many remnants of 
which still exist today. In 1988 the Government's budget deficit 
reached 8.5% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), inflation 
accelerated, the current account deficit doubled to 4.3% of Gross 
National Product (GNP), the external debt service ratio reached 
28% of export earnings, and foreign exchange reserves fell in 
half to $438 million, equal to less than three weeks ofimports.1 
These developments have eroded the ability of the 
government to affect the country's development process. In fact, 
the encow·agement of private sector activity, particularly 
investment, is the only viable option open to the authorities. It 
follows that for policy purposes the most important issue 
involves restructw·ing government expenditures and their 
financing in a manner that would provide the maximum 
inducement to private sector capital formation, especially in 
manufacturing. Operationally, this means finding an optimal 
balance between the government's three most important 
budgetary items: defense, public consumption and 
infrastructural development. More importantly because there is 
*Prnfessor, National Secw·ity Affairs Na val Postgraduate School 
Monete1·ey, California 93943 USA 
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abundant evidence2 that the government's deficits have 
crowded out a certain amount of private investment, the 
authorities must achieve this balance within the context of a 
reduced level of expenditures and/or tax increases. 
Defense expenditures are a logical area for budgetfirY 
cuts: current expenditures account for the major part of 
government budgetary allocations, averaging 65-75 percent in 
recent years. In fact, in recent years defense expenditures 
together with debt servicing have accounted for around 80 
percent of current expenditures. 
While riot necessarily arguing that reduced deferse 
expenditures would free sufficient funds to restore the country's 
deteriorating capital stock, 3 tl:ie p\lrpose of this paper is to 
examine whether defense expe1_1ditures have affected the 
private sector's willingness and ability ·to invest in 
manufacturing. Has the general impact of defense expenditures 
on private investment in manufacturing differed significantly 
from that associated with other. categories of Government 
expenditures? If so, in what regard? Are these differences 
associated with the manner in which defense and expenditw·es 
in other areas are funded? 
Background: 
As noted, previous studies have suggested that 
government expenditures in Pakistan have been a mixed 
blessing. On the one hand, these expenditures have the 
potential to increase private sector profitablity either through 
increases in aggregate d&mand (the Keynesian effect) and/or 
cost reductions (the infrastructural effect). On the other hand, 
public expendtiures appear to compete for funds with the 
3 Robert E. Looney 
private sector, thus reducing ceteris paribus the total volume of 
private capital formation. 
Apparently these effects vary by expenditure category. 
For example, infrastructure investment has played a passive 
role in stimulating follow-on private investment4. Surprisingly, 
there is little evidence that government investment in 
manufacturing crowds out private investment. Instead there is 
a much greater likelihood that other forms of government 
investment may be responsible for the private sector's funding 
difficulties. In particular government investment in public 
enterprises and general government investment seem to be 
more responsible for the country's increasing fiscal imbalances. 
Little can be said on these issues until the issue of 
causation is adequately resolved: 
'· 
Often in studies of this type the direction of causation 
has implicitly been assumed to go from government 
deficits to expanded domestic borrowing to interest rate 
increases and ultimately reduced private investment. 
One could just as easily argue that increased levels of 
private investment have placed pressure on the 
government, wishing to aid private investment while 
simultaneously lacking adequate funding for major 
infrastructural programs, may first grant the private 
sector various forms of relief such as tax holidays 
followed by modest increases in public investment. The 
outcome of this process would be expanded deficits, but 
not necessarily the crowding out of private investment 
in the classical sense. The causation issue must be 
addressed before any defi~itive conclusion can be made 
concerning crowding out. 
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2. As a related issue, the timing of these impacts needs to 
be identified. Many effects associated with government 
deficits are likely to have a delayed impact on private 
investment decisions. Again because the timing of these 
effects has not been identified, the patterns of causation 
are unclear.5 
3. If we assume that interest rate effects are only one 
factor associated with the government deficit as it 
pertains to private investment, the theory of crowding 
out becomes unclear as to the relevant form of the 
budgetay deficit. If the interest rate mechanism is not 
perfect, are private investors more concerned or affected 
(through perhaps credit rationing) by the actual deficit, 
some sort of expected deficit, unanticipated changes in 
deficit, or even deviations in the deficit from some 
longer run budgetary trend? 
4. The environment in which deficits exist needs to be 
identified. Obviously, if deficits stem largely from 
increased government consumption or defence, their 
negative impact on private investment will be greater 
than if they had stemmed simply from increased 
infrastructural investment. 
5. The financing of the public sector deficit and 
government capital formation needs to be examined in 
detail. Have the deficits been associated with 
government investment or consumption? How have the 
deficits been financed as betweeen domestic and foreign 
borrowing? Do the impacts of domestic versus foreign 
borrowing vary with regard to their effect on private 
industrial investment? 
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The Issue of Causation 
Ultimately any statistical test for causation will be 
based on a number of arbitrary assumptions. Still, using a 
number of alternative specifications for the key variables it is 
possible to make some credible inference concerning the timing 
of say government expenditures and public sector deficits: do 
some types of government expenditure tend to generate a 
stream of defifcits (and associated public borrowing) over time 
(soft budgetary constraint6) or · are selected budgetary 
allocations constrained by past deficits (hard budgetary 
constraint). Similarly, which types of expenditures are more 
likely financed (or constrained) through the domestic capital 
markets and which are more reliant (or constrained) by foriegn 
borrowing? 
The original and most widely used causality test was 
developed by Granger7. According to this test (again using the 
example of public expenditures and deficits), deficits affect 
growth of public sector expenditures if this series can be 
predicted more accurately by past values of deficits than by past 
(expenditure) growth patternss. To be certain that causality 
runs from defictits to public expenditures, past values of the 
public deficit must also be more accurate than past values of 
public expenditures at predicting increases in the deficit9. 
Four cases are possible: (a) Government Deficits cause 
Public Expenditures when the prediction error for public 
expenditures decreases when the government deficits is 
incl~ded in the expenditure equation. In addition, when public 
expenditures are added to the deficit equation, the final 
prediction error should increase; (b) Public Expenditures 
cause Government Deficits when the prediction error for 
public expenditures increases when government deficits are 
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added to the regression equation for public expenditures, and is 
reduced when public expenditures are added to the regression 
equation for government deficits; (c) Feedback occurs when the 
final prediction error decreases when government deficits are 
added to the public expenditres equation, and the final 
prediction error decreases when public exenditures ·are added to 
the govenrment deficits equation; and (d) No Relationship 
exits when the final prediction error increases both when 
government deficits are added to the public expenditures 
equation and when public expenditures are added to the deficit 
equation. 
Operational Procedures 
The government expenditure data used to carry out the 
causation testio was derived from data provided by the World 
Bank11. Figures on Gross Domestic Product and the GDP price 
deflator is from various issues of the International Monetary 
Fund, Inernational Financial Statistics Yearbook. All variables 
were deflated by the GDP deflator and are in constant 1985 
prices. For best statistical results, 12 the variables were 
transformed into their logarithmic values13. 
To determine the robustness of our findings and whether 
the results were sensitive to the definition of key variables 
various measures of the deficit were examined. These included 
the actual or realized deficit, the expected deficit (the predicted 
value obtained by regressing each year's deficit on its value for 
the previous year the unexpected deficit (the difference between 
each year's actual deficit and that anticipated based on past 
patterns) and finally deviations of the deficit from its longer 
run growth path (the actual deficit minus the exponential trend 
in the deficit). The same definitioas were used in deriving series 
for public domestic borrowing. 
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Results 
Two sets of causality tests were performed. The first set 
examined the interaction of the three broad categories of 
goverment expenditures: (a) defense,(b) consumption, (c) general 
goverment investment and (d) infrastructure: (a) private sector 
investment in large scale manufacturing and (b) private 
investment in small scale manufacturing enterprises. 
The second set of estimates examined the 
interrelationships between these four ·types of government 
expenditures and . movements in the fiscal deficit. Since 
previous studies have suggested that it is not the deficits per 
se, but rather the method by which they are financed (domestic 
versus foreign) that determines whether crowding out occurs, 
the second set of tables also takes the analysis a step further by 
examining the corresponding link between public sector 
expenditures and the pattern of public sector domestic\foreign 
borrowing. Put differently even though public expenditures in 
certain areas may lead to increased budgetary deficits, 
crowding out might not occur if the authorities are able to fund 
this expenditure through foreign borrowing. 
The analysis produced a number of interesting patterns. 
In particular those for public expenditures and private 
investment in manufacturing provide an interesting contrast in 
the manner in which public sector spending has provided a 
stimulus to private sector capital formation. Specifically: 
1. The impact of defense expenditures (Table 1) on 
investment in large scale manufacturing appears 
consistently strong across all measures of this category 
of expenditures. Also, in all cases the impact lag appears 
quite short, averaging only a yl!ar. 
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2. In contrast to the case for large scale manufacturing, 
defense expenditures have no appreciable effect on 
private investment in small scale manutacturing. 
3. As a basis of comparison, public sector expenditures on 
consumption does not provide a stimulus to private 
investmem in large scale manufacturing. Here, the 
pattern is largely one whereby expanded private 'sector 
activity induces the government to provide additional 
services. For public services (consumption), this process 
occurs over a fairly long period with an average lag of 
three years. 
4. While one might anticipate that general government 
investment, ~specially in the areas of infrastructural 
expansion, would provide a stimulus to private 
investment in manufacturing, this does not appear to be 
the case. In fact, causation is generally from private 
investment to public. For actual pubic investment 
(including both infrastructural and non-infrastructural 
components) the lag is rather short-a year. For longer 
term infrastuctural investment (here proxied as 
expected investment) the lag tends to be about three 
years. Interestingly deviations of public investment from 
its historical exponential trend tend to impact 
negatively on private investment in manufacturing. 
5. Private investment in small scale manufacturing is 
again affected differently than that in larger scale firms. 
In this case (Table 2) public consumption expenditures 
provide a weak stimulus to the private sector. This lag is 
short, averaging about a year. 
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6. Private investment in smaller scale industrial ventures 
interacted with public investment in a manner 
somewhat similar to that found in· larger scale 
enterprises. However several minor differences do 
appear to characterize investment by the private sector. 
First, the lag between private investment and the 
government provision of infrastruture (anticipated 
investment) was shorter (one year) in the case of small 
scale firms. Secondly, while investment impacted 
negatively (not shown here) ·on private investment in 
smaller scale firms, there were no statistically 
significant patterns between private investment and 
deviations from the exponential trend in public 
investment. 
As noted above, in looking for an explanation for these 
patterns, several previous papers have indicated that public 
sector crowding out of private investment may be occurring as a 
result of stepped-up government borrowing in the domestic 
financial markets. To examine this possibility, an analysis 
similar to that performed above was used to identify the 
linkages and causality patterns between the different broad 
types of public expenditures (defence, consumption, and general 
government investment) and potential sources of funding 
(deficits, domestic borrowing, and foreign borrowing). 
Again several interesting patterns appeared: 
1. Of the three types of government expenditures, those 
allocated to defense appear to have the most complex 
budgetary linkages. In one sense the military faces a 
hard budgetary constraint il'l the sense that increases in 
past deficits tend to suppress the expansion in 
allocations to the military. On the other hand, increased 
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~defense expenditures do force an expansion in future 
deficits. 
2. This same general framework carried over to the 
borrowing patterns associated with military 
expenditures. For most measures of domestic borrowing, 
higher growth rates in funding from the domestic 
markets tends to suppress the expansion in future 
military expenditure~. These suppressing effect are most 
important in cases where the rate of borrowing (domestic 
or foreign) expands over its anticipated (or longer term) 
growth rate. Still, feedback effects are present whereby 
military expenditures are in turn generally funded in 
part through both domestic and foreign borrowing. 
3. Since a large portion of public consumption consists of 
· allocations to the military, the budgetary patterns of 
this expenditure category are a bit similar to that 
characterizing defense, particularly consumption's 
relationship to the fiscal deficit. 
4. Several important differences do occur however. The 
major difference between defense expenditures and 
public consumption is associated with the manner in 
wich each is actually funded. Increased growth in public 
consumption definitely contributes to expanded domestic 
borrowing requirement over time. Also the expansion in 
public consumption appears to be more constrained than 
defense during periods of expanded foreign borrowing. 
5. Of the three types of government expenditures 
examined here, general government investment tends to 
have the strongest impact on the public sector deficit . 
• 
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6. For all four measures· of the deficit, increases in general 
public investment tends to result in expanded fiscal 
imbalance. While expanded deficits (actual and 
deviation from the exponential trend) facilitate a future 
expansion in public investment, this effect is weak 
relative to the impact of investment on the-Oeficit. 
7. A clear link also exists between expanded public sector 
investment and increased future domestic borrowing 
requirements. Interestingly enough few links exist 
between the growth in public investment and the 
country's pattern of external public borrowing. 
Summary 
While the results presented above do not provide a 
definitive proof of the existence of the cowding out mechanism 
in Pakistan, they are quite consistent with what one might find 
if the phenomena were present. Public investment and 
infrastructural developmen~ appear · to have the least 
stimulating (and sometimes negative) effect on private sector 
investment. This is ironic given that a major purpose of these 
allocations is to provide a stimulus to follow-on private 
investment. Clearly. this effect stems from the large demands 
placed on the domestic capital . market by this type of 
expenditure. 
At the other extreme is defense. Again a somewhat 
ironic pattern exists by which expanded military expenditures 
provide a generally strong stimulus to private investment in 
large scale private manufacturing. While the analysis does not 
let us identify the cause of this stimulus (general Keynesian 
demand expansion and/or direct linkages to the country's 
military procurement program) the fact remains that the 
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goverment has shown restraint in funding defense expenditures 
once domestic borrowing begin to accelerate. 
General public consumption falls somewhere between 
defense . and investment in affecting the private sector's 
willingness (or ability) to commit capital to manufacturing. 
While the government does fund increased consumption 
~hrough expanded domestic borrowing, the magnitudes 
involved are not as great as with investment. Thus government 
consumption is still able to provide a net positive stimulus to 
small scale private investors {who presumably are not as reliant 
on the domestic capital markets as are their larger scale 
counterparts). 
A Macro-Economic Framework 
The possible presence of crowding out resulting from 
increases in government investment and infrastructural 
development is important for policy design and as such 
warrants further analysis. For this purpose a small 
macroeconomic model based · on the causality findings was 
developed. 
In . constructing the model, our main concern was to 
capture the main areas in which defense and other government 
expenditures might conceivably affect private investment. 
Specifically the model attempts to capture the impact of public 
expenditures by type on the deficit, the impact of the deficit on 
the composition of public hon-owing {domestic versus foreign) 
and domestic savings. Ultimately these links modify the private 
sector's decision to expand or contract capital formation in 
manufacturing. 
Concerning the more important individual relationships: 
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1. Growth is affected mainly by employment lagged 
-nilitary expenditures and private investment.14 
Interestingly, non-defense expenditures were not 
statistically significant in affecting GDP. The same was 
also trne for government investment. 
2. Defense expenditures were found to be a function of 
lagged GDP. In addition allocation to the military were 
found to compete with other forms of public 
expenditures and were reduced with increased funding 
of government investment. As noted in the causality 
analysis, an expansion in the public deficit also 
depresses the rate of increase in follow-on allocations to 
the military. 
3. Private investment in manutacturing follows a 
standard15 distributed lag pattern. Funds allocated to 
this sector are reduced with increased levels of public 
- sector boITowing in domestic markets. Some of the 
pressure on capital markets is reduced with increased 
foreign borrowing. As in the causality tests, military 
expenditures provide a stimulus to investment in large 
scale manufacturing (while non-defense expenditw·es 
provide a stimulus to investment in smaller scale 
plants). As noted by Khan and lqbal16 private 
investment is largely influenced by the country's 
pattern of savings. 
4. Gross National Savings17 expand with the general 
growth of the economy. However these funds are 
preempted (or crowded out) by the fiscal deficit. 
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Historical Simulations 
To test the general accuracy of the model, a historical 
simulation was performed i.e. using the actual values for each 
vai-iable, how well would the model have predicted each of the 
major variables over the period 1974 to 1991. The r~sults (Table 
1) were encouraging, particularly for the all-important GDP, 
and total private investment. The largest error for GDP was 
only 3. 76 percent in the year of political crisis <1977). 
Because of their smaller, absolute values, however the 
errors were often high for private investment in 
manufacturing. Still, during the last several years the 
predicted figures for private capital allocations to this sector 
were close to the actual figures. 
Roughly the same picture emerges when general 
goyern!llent investment was treated as exogenous i.e. when 
actual rather than estimated values were used in the model 
solution (Table 2). 
The next step was to get an idea of the quantitative 
magnitudes. of impact produced by changes in government 
investment. In the first set of simulations, government 
investment was increased (Tabe 3) by 2.5% and 10% over its 
historical . values (with the other behavioral equations left 
endogenous). As a basis of comparison, the base figures are 
those derived (in Table 2) from the actual (realized) levels of 
government investment. 
i 
The results (Table 3) of this simulation provide 
interesting insights to the dynaJllics of the Pakistani ecomomy. 
In particular, increased levels of government investment tend 
to reduce GDP. The suppression in GDP occurs through the 
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Table 1 
Macroeconomic Simulation I, Endogenous Model, 1974-1991 
(billions of 1985 rupees) 
Gross Domestic Product Total Private Investment 
Year 
Actual Est %Dif Actual. Est %Dif 
1974 264.0 245.5 0.2 1:5.7 17.0 7.7 
1975 256.8 259.8 1.2 17.5 11·.9 2.3 
1976 268.8 270.4 0.6 19.3 18.4 5.8 
1977 278.9 290.2 3.9 20.9 19.1 9~5 
1978 301.4 305.6 1.4 21.7 21.0 3.6 
1979 315.9 324.6 2.7 22.4 22.4 0.0 
1980 343.4 341.4 0.6 26.4 24.1 9.6 
1981 367.0 363.7 0.9 28.5 26.1 9.4 
1982 391.0 383.6 1.9 28.1 28.4 0.9 
1983 417.9 408.2 2.4 30.7 .30.6 0.2 
1984 438.7 432.5 1.4 32.8 33.3 1.3 
1985 472.2 460.4 2.6 35.8 36.1 0.7 
1986 498.1 481.4 3.5 38.7 39.2 1.3 
1987 530.1 523.3 1.3 41.1 41.9 2.0 
1988 570.9 549.2 3.9 43.8 46.5 6.0 
1989 611.9 588.5 4.0 51.0 49.8 2.4 
1990 630.9 624.4 1.0 56.0 54.2 3.3 
1991 672.0 670.4 0.3 60.1 59.1 1.8 
P.T.O. 
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Private Non"Manuf lnves -Private Manuf. Invest· -
Year 
Actual Est %Dif Actual Est %Dif 
1974 12.8 13.3 4.2 3.0 3.7 20.5 
1975 14.0 14.6 3.7 3.4 3.3 3.9 
1976 15.5 15.1 2.4 3.9 3.2 22.4 
1977 16.9 15.8 6.6 4.1 3.3 23.3 ~ 
1978 17.9 17.3 3.4 3.9 3.7 4.7 
1979 18.6 18.2 2.2 3.8 4.2 7.6 
1980 21.8 19.1 14.6 4.6 5.0 9.4 
1981 22.5 20.0 12.5 6.0 6.0 0.5 
1982 21.5 21.2 1.7 6.6 7.2 8.5 
1983 22.9 22.1 3.4 7.8 8.5 8.1 
1984 23.9 23.3 2.6 8;9 10.0 10.5 
1985 25.8 24.5 5.3 10.0 11.6 13.4 
1986 26.8 25.9 3.7 11.9 13.3 10.8 
1987 28.5 26.8 6.2 12.6 15.1 16.7 
1988 29.8 29.2 1.9 14.0 17.3 19.2 
1989 32.5 30.4 6.9 18.5 19.4 4.6 
1990 34.3 32.1 6.7 21.7 22.1 1.5 
1991 36.4 34.4 5.9 23.7 24.1 3.9 
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Table 2 
Macroeconomic simulation II: General ·Government Investment 
Set at Historical Values, Foreign Public Borrowing 
Endogenous, 1974-1991 
,_ (billions of 1985 rupees) 
Gross Domestic Product Total Private Investment 
Year 
Actual Est %Dif Actual Est %Dif 
1974 246.0 245.5 0.2 15.7 17.0 7.6 
1975 256.8 260.0 1.3 17.5 17.9 2.4 
1976 268.8 269.9 0.5 19.3 18.2 5.9 
1977 278.9 290.0 3.8 20.9 19.0 10.4 
1978 301.4 306.8 1.8 21.7 21.5 1.0 
1979 315.9 322.5 2.1 22.4 22.7 0.9 
1980 343.4 342.4 0.3 26.4 23.6 11.8 
1981 367.0 369.4 0.6 28.5 25.2 13.1 
1982 391.0 393.1 0.5 28.1 27.1 4.0 
1983 417.9 423.0 1.2 30.7 30.0 2.4 
1984 438.7 445.9 1.6 32.8 33.6 2.3 
1985 472.2 469.6 0.6 35.8 36.0 0.6 
1986 498.1 491.5 1.3 38.7 38.6 0.1 
1987 530.1 534.2 0.8 41.1 41.8 1.8 
1988 570.9 557.0 2.5 43.8 46.9 6.7 
1989 611.9 593.0 3.2 51.0 50.5 1.0 
1990 630.9 625.6 0.9 56.0 54.9 1.9 
1991 672.0 670.3 0.3 60.1 59.1 1.6 
P.T.O. 
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Private Non-Manuf Inves Private Manuf Invest 
Year 
Actual Est %Dif Actual Est %Dif 
1974 2.8 13.3 4.0 2.97 3.73 20.3 
1975 14.0 14.6 3.9 3 41 3.32 3.0 
1976 15.5 15.1 2.3 3.86 3.13 23.0 
1977 16.9 15.7 7.6 4.06 3.28 23.9 
1978 17.9 17.6 1.4 3.84 3.87 0.6 
1979 18.6 18.5 0.5 3.84 4.15 7.3 
1980 21.8 18.7 16.8 4.56 4.92 7.4 
1981 22.5 19.5 15.2 6.00 5.65 6.2 
1982 21.5 20.5 4.8 6.61 6.52 1.4 
1983 22.9 22.0 3.8 7.81 7.92 1.4 
1984 23.9 24.1 0.9 8.94 9.51 6.0 
1985 25.8 25.0 3.3 10.02 11.04 9.3 
1986 26.8 25.8 4.0 11.88 12.86 7.7 
1987 28.5 27.1 5.3 12.57 14.73 14.7 
1988 29.8 29.8 0.2 13.98 17.08 18.2 
1989 32.5 31.1 4.5 18.51 19.42 4.7 
1990 34.3 32.8 4.7 21.71 22.17 2.0 
1991 36.4 34.4 5.7 23.73 24.70 3.9 
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Table 3 
Macroeconomic Simulation III: General Government 
Investment 2.5% and 10% over Historical Values, Foreign 
Public Borrowing Endogenous 
(Billions of 1985 rupees) 
Gross Domestic Product Total Private Investment 
Year 
2.5% Base 10.0% 2.5% Base 10.0% 
1974 245.3 245.5 244.9 17.0 t 17.0 16.9 
1975 260.0 260.0 259.8 17.9 17.9 17.9 
1976 269.4 269.9 268.0 18.3 18.2 18.6 
1977 288.5 290.0 284.7 19.1 19.0 19.4 
1978 304.9 306.8 299.0 21.6 21.5 22.0 
1979 319.8 322.5 311.6 22.8 22.7 23.3 
1980 338.9 342.4 328.1 23.8 23.6 24.3 
1981 365.1 369.4 352.2 25.4 25.2 25.8 
1982 388.2 393.1 373.6 27.2 27.1 27.7 
1983 417.5 423.0 401.0 30.1 30.0 30.7 
1984 439.7 445.9 420.9 33.8 33.6 34.5 
1985 462.6 469.6 441.6 36.2 36.0 36.8 
1986 483.9 491.5 461.1 38.8 38.6 39.4 
1987 526.0 534.2 501.2 42.0 41.8 42.7 
1988 548.0 557.0 521.1 47.2 46.9 47.8 
1989 683.3 593.0 554.2 50.8 50.5 51.5 
1990 615.1 625.6 583.7 55.2 54.9 56.0 
1991 659.0 670.3 625.3 • 59.4 59.1 60.2 
P.T.O. 
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Private Non-Manuf Inves Private Manuf Invest 
Year 
2.5% Base 10.0% 2.5% Base 10.0% 
1974 13.3 13.3 13.2 3.7 3.7 3.7 
1975 14.6 14.6 14.5 3.3 3.3 3.4 
1976 15.2 15.1 15.3 3.2 3.1 3.3 
1977 15.7 15.7 15.9 3.3 3.3 3.5 
1978 17.7. 17.6 17.7 4.0 3.9 4.3 
1979 18.5 18.5 18.6 4.3 4.2 4.7 
1980 18.7 18.7 18.7 5.1 4.9 5.6 
1981 19.5 19.5 19.4 5.9 5.7 6.5 
1982 20.5 20.5 20.3 6.7 6.5 7.4 
1983 22.0 22.0 21.8 8.2 7.9 8.9 
1984 24.0 24.1 23.8 9.8 9.5 10.6 
1985 24.9 25.0 24.6 11.3 11.0 12.3 
1986 25.6 25.8 25.2 13.2 12.9 14.2 
1987 26.9 27.1 26.5 15.1 4.7 16.2 
1988 29.7 29.8 29.2 17.5 17.1 18.6 
1989 30.9 31.1 30.4 19.8 19.4 21.1 
1990 32.6 32.8 32.0 22.6 22.2 24.0 
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associated reduction in defense expenditures (given the 
insensitivity of private investment to changes in the levels of 
public capital formation). 
Upto now the simulations have assumed that the 
pattern of public external borrowing is largely passive, that is 
determined by the endogenous equation12 in Table 6. If instead, 
it is assumed that the government is constrained (to some pre-
assigned level) in its borrowing in foreign capital markets the 
results of the simulations change dramatically (Table 4). 
Again as a basis of comparison, three separate values 
are given for each of the key macroeconomic aggregates: (a) the 
endogenous values are those obtained by letting public foreign 
borrowing increase as in Table 9;(b) stet refers to the results 
obtained when public foreign borrowing was constrained to its 
realized values over the 1974-1991 period; and (c) actual plus 
10% are the values obtained on the assumption that the 
government could not increase foreign borrowing at will i.e, the 
government could increase its foreign borrowing at most up to 
10% over its actual borrowing levels for any one year. 
On the basis of these assumptions, it can be easily seen 
that even with modest increases (2.5%) in government 
investment the ecomomy would come under severe strains 
(Table 4). In particular: 
1. With no increase in public external borrowing in 1991, 
GDP would decline from 659 billion rupees to 570. 7 
billion. 
2. The ecomomy's extreme dependence on external 
borrowing to offset the public sector's crowding out of 
private investment appears to have developed around 
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1984/85 (as evidenced by the widening gap between the 
values obtained in actual and endogenous simulations). 
3. This extreme dependence is evidenced by the fact that in 
recent. years a 2.5 percent increase in government 
investment would have to be matched by an increase in 
public foreign borrowing of over 10 percent simply to 
preserve levels of investment and GDP that would have 
occurred in the absence of these increases in government 
investment. 
Conclusions 
While .. a complete explanation of the reasons the 
government has chosen to fund certain expenditures in certain 
markets is beyond the scope of this study, it is clear that if the 
Pakistani authorities wish to play a more productive role in the 
country's development, they will have to devote just as much 
attention to the financial impacts of public investment as they 
have to the direct economic impacts. 
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Table 4 
Macroeconomic simulation IV: General Government 
Investment 2.5% over Historical Values, With Varying 
patterns of Foreign public Borrowing 
(billions of 1985 rupees) 
Gross Domestic Product Totla Private Investment 
Year 
Borrow Endo gen Actual Act.+10% Endogen Actual Act.+ 10% 
1974 245.3 245.5 245.9 17.0 17.0 17.2 
1975 260.0 259.3 260.6 17.9 17.7 18.1 
1976 269.4 272.4 277.2 18.3 19.3 20.0 
1977 288.5 294.7 299.2 19.1 21.1 22.2 
1978 304.9 311.2 317.6 21.6 23.1 24.4 
1979 319.8 325.9 334.6 22.8 23.3 25.0 
1980 338.9 346.6 358.2 23.8 24.4 26.4 
1981 365.1 373.1 387.4 25.4 26.3 28.7 
1982 388.2 299.6 414.3 27.2 28.2 31.0 
1983 417.5 424.4 445.8 30.1 30.5 33.8 
1984 439.7 442.1 468.7 33.8 32.8 36.6 
1985 462.6 459.7 489.9 36.2 33.7 38.2 
1986 483.9 472.7 508.3 38.8 34.5 39.6 , .. 
1987 526.0 503.8 545.6 42.0 35.8 41.8 
1988 548.0 511.0 560.0 47.2 38.4 45.4 . .1 ' 
1989 583.3 530.2 587.8 50.8 39.7 47.9 
1990 615.1 545.7 613.6 55.2 42.4 52.2 
0 
1991 659.0 570.7 650.5 59.4 44.6 56.1 
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Private Non-Manuf Inves Private Manuf Invest 
Year 
Borrow Endogen Actual Act.+10% Endo gen Actual Act.+ 10% 
1974 13.2 13.2 13.2 3.7 3.7 3.9 
1975 14.6 14.6 14.5 3.3 3.1 3.5 
1976 15.2 15.1 15.2 3.2 4.2 4.9 
1977 15.7 15.9 16.1 3.3 5.2 6.2 
1978 17.7 18.0 18.2 4.0 5.1 5.3 
1979 18.5 18.7 18.9 4.3 4.7 6.0 
1980 18.7 18.9 19.2 5.1 5.5 7.2 
1981 19.5 19.0 20.3 5.9 6.4 8.3 
1982 20.5 20.8 21.4 6.7 7.4 9.7 
1983 22.0 22.2 22.9 8.2 8.2 10.8 
1984 24.0 24.3 25.1 9.8 8.6 11.5 
1985 24.9 25.0 26.0 11.4 8.8 12.2 
1986 25.6 25.4 26.6 13.2 9.1 13.0 
1987 26.9 26.4 27.8 15.1 9.4 14.0 
1988 29.7 28.8 30.4 17.5 9.7 15.0 
1989 30.9 29.4 31.3 19.8 10.3 16.6 
1990 32.6 30.4 32.7 22.6 12.0 19.5 
1991 34.2 31.5 34.2 25.2 13.1 21.9 
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